Service in Civil Contempt Proceedings by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 38 
Number 2 Volume 38, May 1964, Number 2 Article 5 
May 2013 
Service in Civil Contempt Proceedings 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1964) "Service in Civil Contempt Proceedings," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 38 : No. 
2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES
Judge Friendly may well be correct in decrying the confusion
caused by unsound and obsolete standards once promulgated by
Swift v. Tyson and oftentimes espoused by our modern federal
courts and commentators directly in the face of the Erie edict.10 3
He states:
The complementary concepts-that federal courts must follow state decisions
on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas
state courts must follow federal decisions on subjects within national
legislative power where Congress has so directed-seem so beautifully simple
and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder why a century and a half
were needed to discover them, and must wonder even more why anyone
should want to shy away once the discovery was made.' 04
Perhaps Judge Friendly thus strikes the note of harmony between
federal and state laws in diversity cases which will in time prove
to be the wisest and most prudent standard formulated.
A
SERVICE IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
The contempt power was known and enforced by the courts
at an early stage in the development of the common law.'
Historically, the law has distinguished between two distinct types
of contempt.2  When courts employed their contempt power chiefly
as a punitive measure to preserve their authority, vindicate their
judicial dignity and punish the disobedience of their mandates,
the act it disciplined was defined as a criminal contempt.3 How-
ever, when utilized as a coercive instrument to safeguard the private
rights of litigants and to compel obedience to decrees to which
parties were entitled, the chastised act was designated as a civil
contempt.4  Although the distinction between these two contempt
powers is real, one and the same act may often be considered a
criminal as well as a civil contempt.5
In New York, the civil contempt power is embodied in Section
753 of the Judiciary Law. This statute generally defines civil
103 Friendly, supra note 97, at 92.
104 Ibid.
I See Fox, The Practice in Contempt of Court Cases, 38 L.Q. REv. 185(1923).
2 People ex rel. Munsell v. The Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N.Y.
245, 4 N.E. 259 (1886).
3In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902).4 1d. at 453-54.
UUnited States v. United Mineworkers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95
(1947).
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contempt as any misconduct which might impede or defeat the
right or remedy of a party to a civil action or special proceeding.
The purview of the statute is quite broad, encompassing such acts
as the misconduct or disobedience of court officers, witnesses and
litigants. The contempt proceeding has enabled successful litigants
to compel their opponents to carry out a court order or to comply
with a judgment which could not be enforced by execution. More-
over, witnesses who have wilfully refused to obey subpoenas have
been subject to punishment by contempt.
The civil contempt power, although often harsh, has proven
to be an aid in the final settlement and subsequent enforcement
of civil remedies, 6 since the courts have been granted the statutory
authority to punish contemnors by the imposition of a fine, imprison-
ment, or both.7  As one might expect, the requirements of due
process, i.e., notice and opportunity to be heard," must be followed.
At the outset, one must distinguish between the notice required
to hold a party in contempt of court so as to enforce a decree of
the court, and the service of notice to bring him before the court
once the contempt of court has been committed.9 That is, how
does one serve an order or judgment to put a person in contempt
of court; how does one get him before the court once he is in
contempt ?
Service to Enforce Judgments and Orders by Contempt
While the Judiciary Law broadly defines the civil contempt
power, it leaves uncertain the method of notice required to be
given a person to hold him in contempt before the court's order
or judgment may be enforced by that means. Thus, upon a
cursory reading of the judiciary Law, one could conclude that
an order or judgment might be enforced against a person even
though he did not know of the court's determination. Certainly
this would not be consonant with our deep-rooted concept of due
process, the vast corpus of case law concerning civil contempt,
and the myriad of statutes 1o scattered throughout the laws of
6 1947 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL THIRTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT & STUDIES 252; 8 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA Or NEW
YORK PRACTICE, ch. 66 § 10 (1954).
7 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 753 (A).8 M ullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); People ex rel Witherbee v. Supervisors, 70 N.Y. 228, 234 (1877);
Goldie v. Goldie, 77 App. Div. 12, 14, 79 N.Y. Supp. 268 (4th Dep't 1902).
9Grant v. Greene, 121 App. Div. 756, 106 N.Y. Supp. 532 (1st Dep't
1907).
10E.g., N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 123; N.Y. DEBT. & CR.D. LAW§15(16); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 130; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 808; N.Y. NAY.
LAW § 140; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 15-a(4); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY Ac-
TIONS & PROCEEDINGS LAW §§211, 221, 1521(5).
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New York prescribing the punishment of specific acts and the
enforcement of certain decrees by civil contempt proceedings.
The New York courts have held that due process requires
that before a judgment or order may be enforced against a person
by contempt, he must have notice of the order or judgment. How-
ever, they disagree as to what constitutes adequate notice to satisfy
these requirements. Some cases, as will be discussed later, require
personal delivery of the court's decree sought to be enforced, while
others require somewhat less in the way of notice.
A number of cases have held that so long as the person has
knowledge of the court's determination, service of the order or
judgment upon him is unnecessary."1 This was the court's de-
termination in Livingston v. Swift,'2 where a party's knowledge
of an injunction against him through his presence in court when
the order was issued was sufficient notice to put him in contempt
for his wilful disobedience of the injunction. Similarly, in Underhill
v. Schenck,13 where the defendant was not personally served with
the decree, but was fully aware of it, the court held that his
knowledge of the decree and his refusal to comply was adequate
notice to put him in contempt of court.
Another view considers notice to a party's attorney who is
representing him as notice to the party himself. Thus, it was held
that if a copy of the order or judgment is served upon the attorney
of the defendant against whom it was rendered, such service
would satisfy the notice requirement so as to put the defendant
in contempt of court for his subsequent refusal to comply.' 4
However, prior to the enactment of Section 5104 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter referred to as CPLR], the
majority of cases held that before a person could be in contempt
of court for disobeying an order or judgment, a certified copy
thereof had to be delivered to him personally.15 The case most
1IE.g., People ex rel. Platt v. Rice, 144 N.Y. 249, 39 N.E. 88 (1894);
Shakun v. Shakun, 11 App. Div. 2d 724, 204 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dep't 1960);
Application of Belanoff, 277 App. Div. 1056, 100 N.Y.S.2d 851 (2d Dep't
1950); Koehler v. Farmers' & Drovers' Nat'l Bank, 6 N.Y. Supp. 470(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 117 N.Y. 661, 22 N.E. 1134 (1889); Hull v. Thomas,3 Edw. Ch. 236 (N.Y. 1838); People ex rel. Morrison v. Brower, 4 Paige
Ch. 405 (N.Y. 1834); Stafford v. Brown, 4 Paige Ch. 360 (N.Y. 1834).
1223 How. Pr. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861).
13205 App. Div. 182, 199 N.Y. Supp. 611 (2d Dep't 1923).
14 United States v. Sumner, 127 Misc. 907, 217 N.Y. Supp. 645 (Sup.
Ct. 1926). See also Vogemann v. American Dock & Trust Co., 131 App.
Div. 216, 115 N.Y. Supp. 741 (2d Dep't 1909), aff'd men., 198 N.Y. 586, 92
N.E. 1105 (1910).
15 See, e.g., Tebo v. Baker, 77 N.Y. 33 (1879); In the Matter of Mc-
Cullock, 1 App. Div. 2d 968, 150 N.Y.S.2d 531 (2d Dep't 1956); Curtis v.
Powers, 146 App. Div. 246, 130 N.Y. Supp. 914 (4th Dep't 1911); Mc-
Caulay v. Palmer, 40 Hun 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886); McComb v. Weaver,
11 Hun 271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1877).
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often cited for this view is Pittsfield Nat'l Bank v. Bayne 16
wherein the court stated that "the contempt itself, however, can
only be predicated of the client's own act; that is, of his refusal
or neglect to obey the judgment after personal service of a
certified copy thereof upon him. . .. ," 17 While reaffirming this
position, the court in Goldie v. Goldie'8 went a step further by
requiring that a personal demand to comply should be made with
a subsequent refusal by the contemnor. In fact, the court in
McCaulay v. Pahner 10 went to the extreme of requiring that in
addition to personal delivery of the copy, the contents of the
original judgment or order should be exhibited to the person
before he could be in contempt of court for refusal to obey.
However, Basch v. Associated Features Booking Co.,20 held that
while a judgment should be personally delivered to put a person
in contempt, this notice requirement did not hold true for an
order. Thus, the pre-CPLR cases were in disagreement as to
what degree of notice was sufficient to satisfy due process.
Notice Under Section 5104 of the CPLR
This section provides for the enforcement by contempt of
any interlocutory or final judgment or order which is fiot en-
forceable under Article 52 of the CPLR (enforcement of money
judgments by execution) or under section 5102 (enforcement of
judgment or order awarding possession of real property or chattel).
Thus, any judgment or order not for money or requiring the
payment of money or the delivery of real property or a chattel,
may be enforced under this section. The revisers state that the
authority for enforcing orders other than those directing the
payment of money stems from Section 753 of the Judiciary Law.2 1
Moreover, the Civil Practice Act had failed to make provision
for the enforcement of non-money orders, although it did provide
1621 N.Y. Supp. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
17 Id. at 562. "Service upon a party's attorney is not sufficient to bring
him into contempt. The well knovm case of Pitt v. Davidson [sic], 37 N.Y.
242, is cited in support of the opposite doctrine, but that case merely holds
that the papers upon a motion to punish for a civil contempt may, when so
directed by the court, be served upon the attorney for the party who is
proceeded against. . . ." Ibid.
1877 App. Div. 12, 79 N.Y. Supp. 268 (4th Dep't 1902). "The offense
cannot be committed until the order ... has been brought to the attention
of the defendant and demand has been made upon him personally ... and
he is not guilty of contempt of court until after that demand has been
refused or neglected." Id. at 15-16, 79 N.Y. Supp. at 270. See Bradbury
v. Bliss, 23 App. Div. 606, 48 N.Y. Supp. 912 (1st Dep't 1897).
19 40 Hun 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1386).
20 92 Misc. 450, 156 N.Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
211959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 17, THIRD PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY CommirrEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 223.
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a remedy for the enforcement of non-money interlocutory
judgments.22
Section 5104 is founded upon Section 503(3) of the Civil
Practice Act which treated the enforcement of non-money inter-
locutory judgments. There are two CPLR exceptions to section
5104, both of which are found in section 5105. This section
provides that execution or contempt is available for: (1) orders
requiring the payment of money into court or to an officer or
receiver appointed by the court, except money due on an express
or implied contract; or (2) orders requiring a trustee or fiduciary
to pay a sum of money for wilful default or dereliction of duty.
For the most part section 5104 will be employed to enforce
equity decrees not requiring payment of money, e.g., a decree
ordering any of the following: removal of an encroachment, abate-
ment of a nuisance, transfer of stock certificates, an accounting,
execution and delivery of a bond and mortgage, specific perform-
ance of a contract, injunction mandating the doing or the not
doing of an act.
Section 5104 requires that the service of a certified copy of
the judgment or order should be made upon the party or other
person required by law to obey it. His wilful refusal or neglect
to do so will result in punishing him for a contempt of court.
Basically, this is a codification of prior case law which required
service on the person himself rather than upon his attorney.23
Some commentators believe that CPLR Rule 2103(c) might
also be available for service of a section 5104 order or judgment.24
Rule 2103(c) states that when a party's attorney cannot be served,
service may be made upon the party himself, either: (1) by
personally delivering the paper to him, or (2) by mailing the
paper to him, or (3) by leaving it at his residence within the
state with a person of suitable age and discretion. Whether rule
2103(c) will in fact govern will have to be determined by the
courts, for the revisers are silent on this point.25
22 Ibid.
23 Pittsfield Nat'l Bank v. Bayne, 21 N.Y. Supp. 561, 562 (Sup. Ct.
1892).
24 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 15104.13
(1964).
25 It will be interesting to note whether the courts will permit service
to be made under rule 2103(c). Section 5104 prescribes no other service
than "on the party or other person required by law to obey." Given the
inclination of the court, one may not be sure that CPLR R. 2 103(c) will be
applied to service of a judgment or order as a basis for later contempt
proceedings. Applying that provision in such instance would permit mailed
service of the judgment or order to furnish the contempt foundation, and
the weight of authority in New York has required personal delivery of thejudgment or order to the defendant. The courts may prove hesitant to find
authority for service by mail in the (at best) ambiguous language of § 5104.
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However, if the 2103(c) method of service is applied to the
area, previous case law will be expanded. As discussed above,
the majority of cases held that personal delivery of the decree
to the party was a condition precedent to enforcement by contempt
of court. Because those cases also held that an agent's activities
cannot make his principal guilty of contempt, it would seem that
service under section 308(2) would not be available. 2  On the
other hand, since section 308(2) is expressly available for the
service of a summons on the designated agent, the courts could,
on that fact alone, make the provision available for service of the
judgment or order that is to be a contempt foundation.
Under section 5104 a person need not have been a party
to the action; the decree may be enforced against anyone required
by law to obey it. This would be in harmony with the holding
of Daly v. Amberg.27  In this case the defendant fled the juris-
diction in order to evade service of an order to show cause. While
without the state, a temporary injunction was issued against him
and copies thereof served upon his agents. When the agents per-
formed acts 'forbidden by the injunction they were held to be in
contempt, although they had not been parties to the original
action.
However, section 5104 leaves unanswered the question of
whether a demand for compliance need be made upon the party
or person served as a condition to enforce an order or judgment
by contempt. And, if a demand be necessary, the further question
exists as to whether it must be in writing. Apart from the con-
flicting case law,28 the only statutory authority requiring such
a demand is Section 756 of the Judiciary Law which states:
Where the offense consists of a neglect or refusal to obey an order of the
court requiring payment of costs or a specified sum of money, and the court
is satisfied . . . that a personal demand thereof has been made, and that
payment thereof has been refused or neglected; it may issue, without notice,
a warrant to commit the offender to prison. ...
One case has construed this section to apply only where the
offense is the refusal to make payment of money pursuant to
a court order.2 9  Since section 5104 concerns judgments and
orders other than those directing the payment of money, it would
seem that a demand need not be made for the purpose of
26 See Pittsfield Nat'l Bank v. Bayne, 21 N.Y. Supp. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
27 126 N.Y. 490, 27 N.E. 1038 (1891).
28 See Goldie v. Goldie, 77 App. Div. 12, 79 N.Y. Supp. 268 (4th Dep't
1902).
29 People ex rel. Hayes v. Pope, 231 App. Div. 279, 247 N.Y. Supp. 393
(3d Dep't 1931).
[ VOL. 38
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enforcement by way of contempt. 30 In fact, because the judg-
ment or order itself is a command to comply with the court's
determination, it would seem superfluous to require that an
additional demand be made.
Service of Subpoena Under Section 2303 of the CPLR
Subdivision 5 of Section 753 of the Judiciary Law states
that it is contempt of court for a person to cause injury to a
litigant by refusing or neglecting to obey a subpoena. 31  Since
the failure to comply with a subpoena is contemptuous, the
question again arises as to what notice of it is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of due process.
Prior to the enactment of Section 2303 of the CPLR, case
law indicated that a person was not subject to contempt of
court unless the subpoena was personally delivered to him.32
Section 2303 expands the method of subpoena service, allowing
a subpoena to be served in the same manner as a summons.
Thus, all the techniques of service prescribed by sections 308
through 312 are available. The requirement of personal delivery
has not been abandoned, but if after due diligence the subpoena
cannot be personally served pursuant to any of the first three
subdivisions of section 308 (one of which is personal delivery),
service may be effected in accordance with section 308(4), in
such a manner as the court directs. By reading section 2303
with section 308(4), effective service might be sustained by
mailing, telegraphing or even telephoning the subpoena to the
witness. Some jurisdictions have considered this as good
service.3 3
In the light of a few pre-CPLR cases, it does not seem
surprising that the CPLR has taken a liberal approach by
30 However, a demand for compliance with the order or judgment may
be relevant under § 5105 which authorizes enforcement of certain judgments
and orders by contempt. There is disagreement as to whether such a de-
mnand is necessary for the enforcement of such judgments and orders by
contempt. Compare Matzke v. Matzke, 185 App. Div. 533, 173 N.Y. Supp.
244 (1st Dep't 1918) and General Elec. Co. v. Sire, 88 App. Div. 498, 85
N.Y. Supp. 141 (1st Dep't 1903), with Potter v. Emerson-Stueben Corp.,
162 Misc. 392, 294 N.Y. Supp. 970 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 251 App. Div.
841, 296 N.Y. Supp. 684 (Zd Dep't 1937).
31 CPLR § 2308 provides that the failure to comply with a subpoena issued
by a court as well as one returnable in a court shall be punishable as a
contempt of court. This section also provides that the subpoenaed person
shall be liable to the party on whose behalf the subpoena was issued, and
his disobedience of the subpoena will result in his being committed to jail.
32 the Matter of Depue, 185 N.Y. 60, 77 N.E. 798 (1906); Broderick
v. Shapiro, 172 Misc. 28, 14 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1939). See.2 WEIN-
STEI, KoRN; & MILLER, NEWv YORK CrviL PRAwrcnF 112303.03 (1963).33 See cases cited in WENsTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, Opl. cit. sutpra note 32.
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authorizing substituted service of a subpoena in lieu of personal
delivery when with due diligence the latter cannot be effected.
For example, in a recent case 34 a subpoena was served in an
unusual manner. The process server, not having been able to
effect personal delivery, affixed the paper to the petitioner's
door and, employing a portable loudspeaker, announced its con-
tents a dozen or more times from various positions about the
petitioner's dwelling. The court held this to be good service.
This innovation with respect to the service of a subpoena
under the new practice will pose some difficulties. In view of
the harsh penalties of contempt of court, is service other than
by personal delivery constitutional? It has been held that the
legislature may provide for any method of service necessary
to give notice, provided due process of law is observed. 35  It
has also been stated that although due process is not limited
to actual notice, it requires at least that mode of service which
is reasonably calculated to give notice and an opportunity to be
heard."8  This poses an interesting question. How will the
courts deal with the problem of a subpoenaed witness who
technically is in contempt of court, but who had no actual notice
of the subpoena, e.g., where he was served by substituted service,
and where the contents of the subpoena were never communi-
cated to him? A case where this defense proved successful is
In the Matter of Depue 3 7 where the court held that since the
subpoena was served upon the petitioner's attorney and since
the petitioner had no knowledge of its existence, there could be
no contempt of court.
A further difficulty is encountered when' reading the second
sentence of section 2303 which provides: "Any person sub-
poenaed shall be paid or tendered in advance authorized traveling
expenses and one day's witness fee." The courts have held that
in the absence of the payment of such fees and expenses, a
witness has not been lawfully subpoenaed and therefore cannot
be punished for his nonattendance. 38  If such a requirement is
a sine qua non for the effective service of a subpoena, it is
difficult to see how substituted service can be adequate where
the subpoena is served upon the agent of a witness, or is tel-
ephoned or telegraphed. Certainly in view of the previous
decisions concerning the service of a subpoena, the courts will
34 In the Matter of Barbara, 14 Misc. 2d 223, 180 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup.
Ct. 1958), aff'd. 7 App. Div. 2d 340, 183 N.Y.S.2d 147 (3d Dep't 1959). For
a discussion of the case see Note, 10 SYRACUsE L. REv. 363 (1959); Note,
25 BROOKLyN L. REv. 348 (1959).
35 Gutierrez v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 280 U.S. 610 (1930).
36 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928).
37185 N.Y. 60, 77 N.E. 798 (1906).
38 In the Matter of Depue, 185 N.Y. 60, 77 N.E. 798 (1906); People v.
DeValdor, 234 App. Div. 50, 254 N.Y. Supp. 116 (1st Dep't 1931).
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be required te, modify the requirements of the CPLR, or con-
struct a new line of case law heretofore rejected.
Service to Bring the Contemnor into Court
After the contempt of court has been committed, the next
step is the commencement of the civil contempt proceeding to
punish the contemnor. The institution of the civil contempt
proceeding is governed by Section 757 of the judiciary Law.
This section provides that once the court has been satisfied
by affidavit that the contempt has been committed, it may:
(1) Issue an order to show cause why the accused should not be punished
for the alleged offense; or
(2) Issue a warrant of attachment to the sheriff of the particular county
where the accused may be found and order that the sheriff arrest him and
bring him before the court to answer the alleged offense.
This section is consistent with due process; as it affords
the alleged offender an opportunity to prepare a defense in-
dicating why he should not be punished for the contempt.39
If, for example, the proceeding is to enforce an order or judg-
ment pursuant to CPLR Section 5104, the alleged contemnor
might interpose defenses that a certified copy thereof was not
duly served upon him, or that service was not made in accord-
ance with rule 2103(c) (assuming service may be so made),
or that an averment of the petitioner's affidavit was incorrect.
Service of Order to Show Cause
The early cases were. in disagreement as to whether the
contempt proceeding was itself a special proceeding, or whether
it was equivalent to a motion in the original action or pro-
ceeding to punish the contemnor or to enforce an order or
judgment of the court.40  The cases construing the contempt
proceeding as separate and distinct from the original action or
proceeding held that the order to show cause should be served
personally upon the offender after the entry of judgment. They
also held that service on the attorney who appeared for the
contemnor in the original cause was insufficient notice to the
offender 4 ' since there was no presumption that the attorney
"gWard v. Ward, 70 Vt. 430, 41 Atl. 435 (1898).40 Davidowitz v. Hamroff, 196 Misc. 209, 90 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
For a profitable treatment of this area see Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1244, 1247
(1956).
41 E.g., Stark v. Kessler, 277 App. Div. 1122, 100 N.Y.S.2d 872 (2d Dep't
1950); Keller v. Keller, 100 App. Div. 325, 91 N.Y. Supp. 528 (1st Dep't
19641]
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had the authority to appear for him in any subsequent pro-
ceeding.42  However, those cases which regarded the contempt
proceeding as a motion in the original action or proceeding
held that the order to show cause was equivalent to a notice
of motion, and that service of the order on the contemnor's
attorney of record was sufficient notice to the contemnor,43 since
it was usual to serve the attorney with a notice of motion,
rather than the party himself. 4
As originally enacted, Section 761 of the Judiciary Law
appeared to resolve conflicting case law. The statute stated:
"An order to show cause is equivalent to a notice of motion;
and the subsequent proceedings thereupon are taken in the
action or special proceeding, as upon a motion made therein."
However, this section did not clear up the confusion. In
fact, it added to it. In 1946 the following addition to the statute
was recommended: "In a civil contempt proceeding, such order
to show cause may be served upon the attorney of the accused,
unless service upon the accused is ordered by the court or
judge." 45  This recommendation was not adopted. In 1947
the following addition was recommended and in this instance
adopted: "In a civil contempt proceeding, such order to show
cause shall be served upon the accused, unless service upon
the attorney for the accused be ordered by the court or judge." 46
As the statute now reads, even though an order to show cause
is equivalent to a notice of motion in an action or proceeding,
service of the order must be made personally upon the accused
and not his attorney. The only caveat is that the court may
order it to be served upon the accused's attorney as, e.g.,
where personal service upon the accused is difficult, or where
he is purposely evading service.47  A recent case48 construing
this statute held that "attorney" refers solely to the accused's
attorney who appeared for him in the original cause.
1905); Goldie v. Goldie, 77 App. Div. 12, 79 N.Y. Supp. 268 (4th Dep't
1902); Wulff v. Wulff, 74 Misc. 213, 133 N.Y. Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1911),
aff'd, 151 App. Div. 22, 135 N.Y. Supp. 289 (2d Dep't 1912).42Keller v. Keller, supra note 41; Wulff v. Wulff, supra note 41;
cf. Goldie v. Goldie, supra note 41.43E.g., Pitt v. Davison, 37 N.Y. 235 (1867); Curtis v. Powers, 146 App.
Div. 246, 130 N.Y. Supp. 914 (4th Dep't 1911).
44Lederer v. Lederer. 47 Misc. 471, 95 N.Y. Supp. 934 (Sup. Ct.),
rev'd on other graunds, 108 App. Div. 228, 95 N.Y. Supp. 623 (1st Dep't
1905).
451946 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 17, N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL TwELFTH ANNUAL
REPORT & Sruirms 249.
46 1947 N.Y. LEsa. Doc. No. 19, N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL THIRTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT & STUDIES 45.47Id. at 46.
48 Patillo v. Patillo, 12 Misc. 2d 645, 178 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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It is interesting to note that the New York Surrogate's
Court Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in
disagreement with section 761. The Surrogate's Court Act
provides: "The application to punish for contempt of court may
be commenced by service of an order to show cause either upon
the respondent personally or upon his attorney." 49  The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure state: "Whenever under these rules
service is required or permitted to be made upon a party repre-
sented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the at-
torney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court." 50
Section 761 authorizes service of the order upon the accused
and precludes service on his attorney except under extraordinary
circumstances. As to how service is to be effected, it has
apparently been left to the court to provide the method on a
case by case basis, limited only by the constitutional require-
ments of due process. That conclusion is implicit in the statute's
requirement that a show cause order be employed to commence
the contempt proceeding. The order to show cause itself should
direct the method of service, and the court, in selecting the
method, should be restricted only by the due process require-
ment that the mode used give the alleged contemnor adequate
notice of the proceeding.
Warrant of Attachment
The second and more unusual method of instituting a civil
contempt proceeding is the issuance by the court of a warrant
of attachment ordering the sheriff to arrest the contemnor
and to bring him before the court to answer the contempt of
court charges. This method is employed only when the court
has reason to believe that the accused might conceal himself
or flee the state in order to evade the contempt proceeding.
It should be understood that the arrest itself is not the punish-
ment of the contempt of court,5 ' rather it is the method of
bringing the accused before the court in order to secure the
rights of the petitioner.
Although at the time of the attachment a copy of the
warrant and the affidavit upon which it is issued are required
by the statute to be delivered personally to the accused, there
is no requirement that he be given notice of the issuance of
the warrant. 52  This would defeat the purpose of the at-
49N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 84.50 FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b).
5' Sonn v. Kenny, 63 Misc. 251, 116 N.Y. Supp. 613 (Sup. Ct 1909).
52 Pitt v. Davison, 37 N.Y. 235 (1867); Pond v. Tamsen, 15 Misc. 364,
37 N.Y. Supp. 407 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
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tachment which is to arrest the accused before he has the
opportunity of fleeing the jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Since the CPLR has not required personal delivery of a
judgment or order enforceable by contempt of court, whether
that will be necessary must await court construction. The courts
may also be occupied with cases challenging the substituted
service of a subpoena under section 2303.
This article has highlighted only some of the difficulties.
Both bench and bar have been aware for some time of the need
for corrective legislation in the contempt sphere. That such
legislation may not be too long in coming is indicated by the
recent promulgation by the Judicial Conference of its 1964
rules amendments. The CPLR Committee of the Judicial
Conference has listed the overhaul of New York's contempt
provisions, as contained in the Judiciary Law, as a subject for
study and possible future action.53
53 Topic No. 18 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT TO THE 1964 LEGISLA-
TURE ON THE POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS IN THE JUDICIARY LAW.
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